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6.1  Introduction 
The failure of the law of one price has been a puzzle for economists at least 
since Isard’s classic 1977 study. There has been renewed interest in this prob- 
lem recently. A significant motivation for this resurgence of interest has been 
the  apparently large misalignment of prices between  the  United  States and 
other countries, most notably Japan. For example, in April 1995, according to 
the Economist, a Big Mac cost $2.32 in the United States but the dollar price 
of a Big Mac in Japan was $4.65. In June 1995, the cover price of an issue of 
the Economist was $3.50 in the United States, but the equivalent dollar price 
in Japan was $10.24. 
A related question in international trade has concerned the degree to which 
markets have become regionalized. That is, are goods markets more integrated 
within regions than across regions? That is the question Frankel, Stein, and 
Wei (1  994) address by examining the flow of goods between countries intrare- 
gionally and interregionally. They found that the claims that regional trading 
blocs are emerging are greatly exaggerated. We address this issue by examin- 
ing whether price variability is smaller within regions than between regions. 
A region might consist, for example, of the nations of the European Union, 
or the states of the United States. There are several reasons why there may be 
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smaller price disparities intraregionally than interregionally. Most obviously, 
two locations within a region are usually closer than two locations in different 
regions. The pricing-to-market literature (see, for example, Dornbusch  1987; 
Krugman  1987; Froot and Klemperer  1989; and Knetter  1989) has generally 
assumed that locations are completely separated, so that price discrimination 
is feasible, without any possibility of consumers arbitraging differences in final 
goods prices. Engel and Rogers (1995) have noted that, while little arbitrage 
is used to take advantage of  differences in prices of consumer goods, at the 
intermediate goods level some constraints on the degree of price discrimina- 
tion are possible. The closer two locations are, the less dispersion is likely in 
these intermediate goods prices. This in turn will reflect on the amount of cohe- 
sion in final goods prices. We would expect the amount of price dispersion to 
be positively related to the distance between the locations. 
Another reason why there may be less price variability intraregionally is that 
the nominal exchange rate between locations within a region is often fixed, or 
at least not very variable. Cities within the United States share a common cur- 
rency; the exchange rate between Germany and the Netherlands has been virtu- 
ally fixed for a number of years; and the French franc has floated against the 
German mark within a narrow band under the exchange rate mechanism of the 
European Monetary System. If nominal prices  are sticky in the currency of 
the country in which the final good is sold, then when the nominal exchange 
rate  between  two  countries  is highly  volatile,  the relative  prices  of  similar 
goods across the two countries will be similarly volatile. On the other hand, 
when  the  exchange rate is quiescent, there  is not much variance  in relative 
prices. 
A third possible explanation for the importance of regions is that frequently 
countries in a region form free trade areas, customs unions, or common mar- 
kets. The absence of barriers to trade clearly could help to explain why the law 
of one price holds more nearly within regions. 
Price dispersion may be smaller for countries within a region because price- 
discriminating  monopolists  may  charge  similar  markups.  The  pricing- 
to-market literature has placed emphasis  on how these markups respond to 
changes in the exchange rate. We note that variation in markups could account 
for fluctuations in prices of  similar goods between locations. Within a region 
there may be  smaller differences in demand elasticities across locations, so 
there may be little variation in markups intraregionally. 
The pricing-to-market literature focuses on the prices of exports. Our work 
examines consumer prices. One channel for price variation that would be im- 
portant in retail prices, but not reflected in export prices, arises from the costs 
associated with distribution and marketing. If these costs vary from location to 
location, they can contribute to price dispersion. We shall argue that a distin- 
guishing feature of locations within a region is that they share a unified distri- 
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chain in the United States sells some product, many of the costs of bringing 
that good to market are not specific to the location in which the good is sold. 
Advertising, packaging, and services undertaken at the corporate headquarters 
are reflected in the final goods price, but are not a function of conditions in the 
retailing location. So prices of goods distributed under a unified system share 
a significant common cost component. 
Recent studies have amassed important new evidence on the nature of fail- 
ures  of  the  law of  one price. The large empirical literature  on  pricing-to- 
market-which  examines export  and  import prices  of  very  homogeneous 
products-has  recently been augmented by Knetter’s study (1994) of pricing 
to market of  German exports.  Knetter concludes that German firms charge 
much higher prices to Japanese importers than to other markets, and thus pric- 
ing to market accounts in large part for the high Japanese retail prices. Engel 
(1993) examines the extent to which failures of the law of one price can explain 
real exchange rate movements. He finds that the relative prices of similar goods 
across countries have much greater variance than relative prices of different 
goods within a country. Rogers and Jenkins (1995) reach similar conclusions 
regarding the degree of persistence of shocks to relative prices. Engel and Rog- 
ers (1995) find that the dispersion of prices of similar goods between cities in 
Canada and the United States is greater the farther apart the cities are. This 
evidence favors the notion that price discrimination can account for price dif- 
ferences between locations. But they find that the variance is much greater for 
cities that lie in different countries compared to equidistant cities in the same 
country. This indicates that marketing costs or price stickiness is important. 
Ghosh and Wolf (1994), examining the cover price of  the Economist, find 
evidence in favor of  the sticky-price story as opposed to pricing to market. 
They find that the time pattern of price adjustment is consistent with a menu- 
cost explanation of price adjustment. Froot, Kim, and Rogoff (1995) examine 
several decades of data on individual goods prices of commodities in England 
and Holland. They find that the degree of persistence of deviations from the 
law of one price has not changed much over the centuries,  suggesting that 
nominal exchange rate volatility cannot account for all of the failure. Cumby 
(1993) finds that in fact there is fairly rapid convergence to the law of one price 
for Big Macs during the floating rate period: 70 percent of the price gap across 
countries disappears within a year. 
Here we explore further the notions that pricing to market and nominal price 
stickiness matter for the failures of the law of one price. The basic notion of 
this paper is that the degree of failure of the law of one price for goods sold in 
two different locations will depend on the distance between those locations if 
price discrimination is significant. To the degree that nominal price stickiness 
is important, however, prices of  similar goods will exhibit more variance be- 
tween countries the greater is the variation in the nominal exchange rate of 
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dozens of countries, we relate the variation in prices of similar goo.ds across 
countries to the distance between  those countries, and the variance of their 
nominal exchange rates.’ 
But, as we have noted, we pay special attention to the variability of prices 
within regions. If the markups are more similar within regions, or if the distri- 
bution system is more homogenized, then we expect that price dispersion will 
be lower for pairs of countries located within regions. 
In section 6.2, we review some of the standard explanations for the failure 
of the law of  one price. We discuss how market segmentation and price dis- 
crimination can lead to failures,  and the role of sticky nominal prices. Our 
story about unified distribution systems within a region is less familiar, so we 
lay out a simple model and explore its implications. 
Then we proceed to examination of the data. First, we describe the data on 
goods prices and provide some summary statistics. The remainder of the paper 
is concerned with the regressions relating price dispersion to distance and other 
geographic factors, exchange rate variability, measures of trade barriers, and 
regional variables. 
6.2  Failure of the Law of One Price and Regionalization 
When the law of one price fails between two locations, there is evidence that 
the markets are not completely integrated. One of the most direct implications 
of  rational  behavior  is that two  identical goods  selling in  the  same market 
should have the same price. 
Clearly one reason that prices may not be equalized is that there is some 
cost to shipping goods between locations. Even prices of  such homogeneous 
and durable goods as copper, for which international commodity markets are 
well-established, have some price variation across locations. When goods are 
costly to transport, then arbitrage may not fully equalize prices. 
If transport costs are sufficiently high, then no arbitrage takes place. That is 
the assumption implicit in much of the “pricing-to-market,”  or exchange rate 
“pass-through,’’ literature. In fact, there seems to be very little evidence of arbi- 
trage  in final goods beyond  a few well-known  anecdotes. For example, we 
know that shopping malls appeared on the northern border of the United States 
at a time when many prices of consumer goods were lower in the United States 
than they were in Canada (when prices were expressed in a common currency). 
More recently, before the peso devaluation in late 1994, similar outlets opened 
on the US. side of  its southern border. At times it has been relatively easy for 
consumers to import luxury German cars directly from Germany, rather than 
buying them from a U.S. dealer. And there is the famous puzzle that, for some 
consumer products, Japanese find it cheaper to fly to the United States and buy 
1. Wei and Parsley (1995), in a work done simultaneously and independently, address many of 
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the goods from American retailers than to buy them at Japanese outlets. How- 
ever, all of these practices are small relative to the total volume of trade. 
But the dearth  of  opportunities for arbitrage  in final goods undoubtedly 
masks the constraints that international trade places on final goods prices. As 
Engel and Rogers (1995) note, the final good purchased by consumers is really 
a joint product-the  actual good itself, and the retailing services that bring the 
good to market. We can think of the physical good as an intermediate good, 
with price q, that is an input into the final consumer good. Suppose there were 
iceberg transport costs, so that only a fraction of the good, 6, remained after 
the good was shipped to a foreign country. Arbitrage insures that q 5 q*/S, 
where q*  is the price of  the intermediate good in the foreign country. If this 
relationship did not hold, arbitrageurs would export the good from the home 
to the foreign country, which would tend to drive up prices domestically and 
down abroad. Similarly, we must have 6q* 5 q, lest arbitrageurs export goods 
from the foreign country to the home. So fluctuations in the relative price of 
the intermediate good in the two locations are constrained within bands: 6 I 
Tariffs or other barriers to trade act much like transport costs in creating 
wedges between prices of traded goods in different locations. Suppose that the 
foreign country puts an ad valorem tariff of T*  on imports from the domestic 
country. Then, arbitrage guarantees only q*  5  (1 + T*)q. Likewise, if T is the 
tariff rate imposed by  the domestic country, q I  (1 + T)q*.  So the relative 
price q/q* can fluctuate in the range from 1/(1 + T*) to 1 + T. 
The distribution and marketing services contribute to the cost of  the final 
good. If the good were sold in competitive markets, the price of the good would 
be greater than q by an amount equal to the value of the marginal product 
of  the factors providing the distribution and marketing services. Even if  the 
intermediate product were to have the same price in the two locations, the retail 
price could differ because nontraded  inputs go into marketing.  Sanyal and 
Jones (1982) present a general equilibrium model that has this structure-no 
final goods are traded, but all consumer goods contain an intermediate traded 
component, which they call a “middle product.” As returns to the nontraded 
inputs into marketing vary over time, the final goods prices will vary between 
locations. 
If  final goods could be traded costlessly, then taxes (other than trade taxes) 
should not contribute to differences in prices between locations. Gasoline sells 
for the same price on either side of State Line Road, which separates Kansas 
City, Kansas, from Kansas City, Missouri, although gasoline taxes are different 
in the two states. But, if the final product is not traded, then both taxes levied 
on producers  and consumers may cause prices to differ between  locations. 
These would cause differences in prices in exactly the same way as returns to 
nontraded factors used in marketing and distribution: variation over time in 
taxes can lead to variation over time in relative final goods prices. 
It is probably  not accurate to describe most consumer goods markets  as 
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competitive. If  there is some monopoly  in the final goods market, then the 
price may exceed marginal cost. In most models of imperfect competition, the 
size of the markup is inversely related to the elasticity of demand for the prod- 
uct. The elasticity of demand may be different in different locations, and may 
vary over time, both because tastes are different (and changing) and because 
the elasticity of demand may change as we move along a given demand curve. 
We note that our empirical work detects movement in the prices of  similar 
goods in different locations. If prices were not equalized, but the discrepancy 
were constant, it would not show up in our data. We can conclude that devia- 
tions from the law of one price of the type we detect can be attributed to (1) 
the wedge in the price of traded intermediate goods that arises from transport 
costs or from trade taxes; or (2) variation in the prices of nontraded inputs into 
distribution, in consumer and producer taxes, and in the markup over marginal 
costs. Constant ad valorem tariffs or iceberg transport costs allow variation 
in the relative prices between locations. However, the differences in prices of 
nontraded  inputs,  consumer or producer  taxes, or markups across locations 
need to change over time to account for variation in relative prices. 
One other explanation for failures of the law of one price that vary over time 
arises when final goods prices are set in the currency of the location where the 
good is sold. If  these prices are preset, and thus  do not respond rapidly to 
shocks, then the prices between locations will change if they are expressed in 
a common currency and the nominal exchange rate varies. Floating exchange 
rates have been very volatile-much  more volatile than aggregate price levels 
at the least (see Mussa 1986), so the sticky-price theory seems a natural path 
to explore. A complete theory of sticky nominal prices would take into account 
some of the factors we have already noted. 
For example, consider a menu-cost model of the type proposed by Mankiw 
(1985).  When there is an infinitesimal shock to demand, the loss in profits from 
not adjusting prices in that model is second-order. For a small but finite shock 
to demand, there is a loss in profits if the price is not adjusted optimally. How- 
ever, if there is a small menu cost, then nonadjustment may be optimal. The 
size of menu costs needed to make sticky prices optimal depends on the elas- 
ticity of demand. If demand were perfectly elastic, as in competitive markets, 
then the firm would lose all of  its sales if  it did not adjust prices. The more 
inelastic is demand, the smaller the loss from nonadjustment. 
In the international context, distance between locations could contribute to 
price stickiness. The more isolated a country is, the fewer foreign competitors 
it will have. U.S. car manufacturers are less vulnerable to imports of German 
cars than are French producers, because of transport costs. When a firm faces 
fewer competitors, the elasticity of demand for its product will be lower, thus 
increasing the likelihood of nominal price stickiness. 
In the introductory remarks,  we noted  that two countries  within  a region 
may have a higher correlation of prices of similar goods for a number of rea- 
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hence markups) may be more similar, and their nominal exchange rate may be 
less variable. These effects are familiar. In section 6.3, we advance a theory 
based on distribution costs. Locations in a region may share a common distri- 
bution system. 
6.3  Distribution Costs and Regions 
6.3.1  Prices within a Region 
A model in which intermediate goods are traded but final goods are sold 
only to domestic consumers by a monopolistic distributor captures the essen- 
tial features described in section 6.2. Prices differ between locations because 
of location-specific costs of marketing, and because of differences across loca- 
tions in the markup by the monopolist. 
Not all marketing costs are local. Corporations often set up distribution net- 
works to many locations. The distribution entails fixed costs that are not spe- 
cific to the point where the good is sold. For example, advertising campaigns 
generally  entail significant  up-front  costs that are large relative to the local 
costs. The services performed at corporate headquarters-accounting,  legal, 
management, and so forth-are  not location specific. Packaging and assembly 
often occurs at a single plant, with the final product distributed to many loca- 
tions. 
Our definition of “region” is a group of locations that share a distribution 
system. This region may consist of cities in one country or a part of a country, 
or a group of countries. Indeed, a set of  locations may be a region for some 
goods while for other goods it is not. 
Our definition of region stems in part from our earlier work (Engel and Rog- 
ers 1995). There we investigated  the dispersion  of prices  of  similar goods 
among twenty-three cities in Canada  and the  United  States. We found that 
distance between locations was important in explaining the range of  fluctua- 
tions of prices between city pairs. However, taking distance into account, there 
was much more dispersion between city pairs that lay on opposite sides of the 
international border than for city pairs within either country. One explanation 
for this finding is that prices are sticky in terms of the currency of the country 
that the good is sold in. Because the exchange rate was floating between these 
two countries, the relative prices between cross-border city pairs fluctuated as 
the exchange rate changed. 
However, we found that the sticky-price story cannot account for more than 
half  of  the border  effect. We  can measure relative prices  between locations 
without taking the exchange rate into account. For example, we can take the 
price of food in Toronto relative to the overall consumer price index (CPI) in 
Toronto, and compare that to the price of food in Chicago relative to the overall 
CPI in Chicago. There is a significant border effect even when using these 
relative-relative prices. That is, relative-relative prices among cross-border city 160  Charles Engel and John H. Rogers 
pairs are still much more variable than relative-relative prices for intranational 
city pairs, taking into account distance effects. One cannot attribute this finding 
to sticky prices and floating exchange rates, since the exchange rate is not used 
in the calculation of  prices. Although  we do not pinpoint  the source of this 
border effect, a plausible explanation is that there is more integration of the 
distribution and marketing systems for cities within each country than there is 
across countries. 
Our model consists of two small countries in general equilibrium. We con- 
sider two cases. When intermediate goods are traded, but not final goods which 
require marketing inputs, then the two countries are not members of a region. 
When the two countries share a marketing system so that all final goods can 
be traded between themselves, but not with the rest of the world, they are in a 
region. To keep matters simple, we eliminate all of the complications discussed 
in section 6.2-transport  costs, tariffs and taxes, sticky prices, and so forth. 
Furthermore, when we consider two countries within a region, we assume an 
exporter bears no marketing costs that are local in the importing country. 
We first consider the model with no “region.” 
There are four goods. A unit of good z,  which is the numeraire, is produced 
with  one unit  of labor in  all countries-at  home, abroad, and in the world 
economy. This good is consumed by individuals, and does not require any mar- 
keting. It can be thought of as a simple, homogeneous product such as fuel oil. 
Engel (1993) finds that, even for consumer prices, the failure of the law of one 
price is not too large for such products. 
Good x also requires a fixed labor input. Its price in the world economy is 
p,.  The required labor input for good x  may differ in the home country and the 
foreign country, and in each country this may differ from p,. There is a fixed 
supply of labor at home and abroad. In each country that labor force is devoted 
entirely  to the production of good x or good z, depending on the pattern  of 
comparative advantage.* Each country acquires the good it does not produce 
through international trade, either with the other small country or with the rest 
of the world. 
So, let L be the labor supply in the domestic country. If the country produces 
good z, then L -  z is the amount of exports of good z, and we have 
L -  z  = p*x. 
If the country produces good x,  its exports are L -  prx  and its imports are z. 
There are  also two final goods that require  marketing.  For concreteness, 
think of the two goods as McDonald‘s hamburgers (good 1) and Wimpy’s ham- 
burgers (good 2). Consumers in each of the domestic and foreign countries get 
utility from consumption of both goods. However, both goods are not necessar- 
ily marketed in each country. 
2. Except, of’ course, in the knife-edge case in which the required labor input for good x equals 
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Both goods use x as an intermediate input. For now, we concentrate on the 
home country. Output of goods 1 and 2 is determined by the production func- 
tions 
y,  = yx, -  -a, 
and 
y2 = qx, -  b. 
The marginal costs in units of good x  of marketing goods 1 and 2 respectively 
are lly and l/q. These costs may be different in the foreign country. The fixed 
costs of marketing--a  and 6-may  also be different in the foreign country. 
When the two small countries  are not in a region, goods 1 and 2 are not 
traded. Consumers must buy these goods from local producers. 
The representative consumer maximizes 
subject to the constraint 
n + L = p,c, + p2c2  + c.. 
The representative consumer owns shares in the firms that produce goods 1 
and 2. It takes the profits from these firms as given. The sum of the profits the 
consumer receives from these firms is n . 
Demand for each good is given by 
CI = (pl/(Y)-l/+, 
C? = (p,/@)-”+, 
c; = II + L -  c, -  c2. 
and 
We assume that L is so large that consumption  of z  is always positive.  Note 
that the elasticity of substitution between c,  and c2.  as well as the elasticity of 
demand for c,  and c2 with respect to p,  and p2  respectively, are given by  l/$. 
If, in equilibrium, either good 1 or good 2 is not produced, then its demand is 
zero, but the demand for the other goods is as given. 
The monopolists that produce goods 1 and 2 set prices to maximize profits 
given by 
n, = plyl -  p,x,,  subject toy, = c,, 
and 
112 =  p2y2 -  p,x2,  subject to y2 = c2. 





If, at these prices, one or both firms’ profits are negative, the firm chooses not 
to produce at all. (The fixed costs--a  and b-are  not sunk costs.) 
The equilibrium condition for the economy, 
pix + 2 = p,(x, + x2)  + c;, 
is equivalent to the representative consumer’s budget constraint, with II  = rIl 
If both Wimpy’s and McDonald’s hamburgers are sold in the home country, 
+ q. 
the exact price index for hamburgers, p,  is given by 
+/(+-I1 
,p,‘””/+  + (1 -  w)p  f+-Il/+ 
where the weight that good  1 receives in the index, w, is given by 
01 I/+ 
w=  (yw + PI/+‘ 
Of  course, if only one of the burgers is sold in the home country, the burger 
price index is simply the price of that burger. 
The setup is the same in the foreign country, but any of the taste or technol- 
ogy parameters may be different than in the home country. We have 
p* =  PX 
I  y*(l -  +*)’ 
and 
PX 
p,* = rl*(l -  4*)’ 
if both goods are produced. 
There are a large number of  cases to consider when the countries are not 
part of a region, but we will focus on one in which only McDonald‘s burgers 
are sold in the home country and only Wimpy’s burgers are sold in the foreign 
country. In other words, in the home country, the fixed cost a is low enough so 
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firm to make profits. The situation is reversed in the foreign country. So, p = 
p,  andp* =  pf. 
In this case, there are two reasons why hamburger prices could be different 
at home and abroad-the  marginal cost of distribution could be different (l/y 
versus l/q*),  and the markup could differ (1/( I -  +) versus 1/( 1 -  +*)). 
Now, compare this to the case in which the two countries are in a region. 
For simplicity, we consider a world in which McDonald‘s in the home country 
is licensed to sell McDonald‘s hamburgers in both countries (so that the foreign 
producer of McDonald‘s is ruled out of the market) and the foreign Wimpy’s 
is licensed to sell Wimpy’s burgers in both countries. Alternatively, we could 
think of this as being the case in which the fixed costs b and a*  are so high that 
firm 2 at home and firm 1 abroad would never find it profitable to sell burgers. 
Each producer can price discriminate, since it is the only one with the distri- 
bution facilities to sell its burgers in both countries. So McDonald’s will set 
prices as 
PX 
PI  = ~~~ Y(1  - 44’ 
and 
Wimpy’s prices will be 
and 
Note that, if 4 = +*, then prices of both burgers are the same at home and 
abroad. 
Even if  4 = +*, the  burger price  indexes need  not  be identical. Home- 
country residents, for example, might have a preference for McDonald‘s ham- 
burgers, so o  > ox.  Under these assumptions, however, it is easy to show that 
(p/~*)~,  the ratio of the price indexes if these two countries were in a region, 
is closer to unity than p,/p,*,  which would be the ratio of the price indexes if 
the two countries were not in a regi~n.~  This means that the range of fluctuation 
of the relative burger price indexes would be smaller for two countries that are 
in the same region. 
However, if the elasticities of demand in the two countries are sufficiently 
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different, so that the difference in the markups is large, it is possible that the 
burger price index could fluctuate even more for two countries that are in the 
same region than for countries that are not in the same region. This theoretical 
possibility  seems unlikely  to occur in practice, however, because it requires 
large differences in tastes between residents in the two locations. 
The utility function in this section is separable in consumption of goods  1 
and 2. This results in a demand curve for good  1 that does not depend on p2, 
and likewise for good 2. This rules out an important case that section 6.3.2 
discusses: that McDonald’s could drive out Wimpy’s (or vice versa) if the two 
countries are in a region. In the model of  this section, regionalization  might 
cause the burger price indexes in the two locations to be more nearly equal 
because it leads to a diffusion of  products across the regions. Wimpy’s and 
McDonald’s are consumed in both regions after regionalization, so the burger 
price indexes are weighted averages of both burger prices in both locations. In 
the model of section 6.3.2, regionalization leads to harmonization of  burger 
prices simply because one burger firm becomes dominant and drives out the 
other. Everybody in both locations ends up eating only McDonald‘s burgers. 
Before turning to that model, we close out the model of a country within a 
region by noting the equilibrium conditions for the home country, which pro- 
duces good  1. Profits for industry 1 are given by 
The budget constraint for individuals is given by 
n,  + L = p,cl  + p2c2  + z. 
Combining these two yields the trade balance condition, with exports on the 
left-hand side (assuming the country exports good x as well as good  1): 
p,(y, -  c,>  + f. -  p,x, = z  + pzc2. 
6.3.2  Can Regionalization Reduce Variety? 
In this section, we consider a world in which consumers might switch from 
Wimpy’s burgers to McDonald’s burgers if  the price of McDonald’s burgers 
were low enough. When the two countries are isolated, Wimpy’s could exist in 
one and McDonald‘s in the other. But, if firms are able to extend their distribu- 
tion system across both countries, we may find that the firm that is most effi- 
cient at marketing drives out its competitor, even when the goods are not identi- 
cal. What we are describing, of  course, is the homogenization  of  consumer 
products across countries that any world traveler will have noticed. 
The model presented here is highly parameterized, because what we wish 
to show is that, for some parameter values, McDonald’s might drive Wimpy’s 
out. We  will  first consider the equilibrium  when  the two countries are in a 
region so that final goods can be marketed in both countries, and show how 
only McDonald’s might sell burgers. Then we show that, if  the two countries 
were not members of a region, Wimpy’s might be sold in one of the countries. 165  Regional Patterns in the Law of One Price 
Consumers in both countries have the same preferences. In the home coun- 
try, they maximize 
If  both  goods  1  and 2 are sold in the market, the demand by  a typical con- 
sumer is 
c, =  P2 
2P,(P, + PJ’ 
and 
PI  c,  = 
2P,(P, + PI) 
We  assume that world population is 2, so, letting a tilde represent world de- 
mand, we have ?,  = 2c, and Z2 = 2c,. 
Suppose one of the goods, good 2, is not sold. Then demand for good  1 is 
given by 
1 
and?, = Up,. 
Firm  1 in the home country can produce McDonald‘s burgers according to 
y1 = XI  -  a. 
Firm 2 in the foreign country can produce Wimpy’s burgers with the produc- 
tion function 
y,“ = x,” -  b* 
We will assume that b and a*  are so high that there are no competitors to these 
two monopolists that sell the same type of  burger. Of course, they compete 
with each other, since the demand for one’s burger depends on the price of 
the other’s. 
For notational convenience, we will drop the * when denoting firm  2’s price 
and output. 
Firms 1 and 2 are nearly symmetric. They face symmetric demand curves, 
and they have the same marginal cost of production. The only difference is that 
their fixed costs could differ. We will assume that McDonald‘s has the lower 
fixed costs, so a < b*. 
The fixed costs are not sunk costs, so if the firm decides not to produce, it 
does not bear any costs. Still, it is helpful  first to calculate the equilibrium 
prices and profits if the costs were sunk, as a step toward finding the full equi- 
librium. So we will use the superscript SC  (for sunk costs) to denote prices and 
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We  shall see that in this equilibrium both firms choose to produce if  they 
ignore fixed costs. Hence, each firm faces the demand curve derived under the 
assumption that both goods are produced. 
From the first-order condition  for firm  1, taking firm 2’s  prices as given, 
we have 
PSC = P, +  P,’  + PIP2  ’  i  1 
For firm 2, we have 
I12 
psc  2  = p,  + (Pi + PAPl) . 
Solving these two equations, we get 
Profits for firm 1 are given by 
We see that firm 1 chooses to produce at this price if it is ignoring fixed costs, 
since its profits exceed -p,a.  Using the fact that pfc = pSc = 3p,, we can solve 
for cI and calculate 
1 
nSc  = 3 -  pxa. 
Parallel computations show 
1 
=F = 3 -  pxb*, 
so, ignoring fixed costs, firm 2 also decides to produce. 
Firm  1  might want to set its price lower than pfC,  however. If it set its price 
low enough, demand for firm 2’s product might fall so low that firm 2 would 
not make a profit if it took into account its fixed costs. If firm 2 decided not to 
compete, then firm  1  has captured the entire market. Its demand will be higher 
and its profits may be higher than when it sets its price at pfc. 
Specifically, if firm 1 has captured the entire market, then its revenues are 
unity irrespective of the price it charges, since pic, = 1 in that case. If firm  1 
had the whole market to itself with no threat of entry by firm 2, it would pro- 
duce arbitrarily close to zero and charge an arbitrarily high price. Because firm 
2 is a potential entrant, however, it would set a price just low enough so that 
firm 2’s profits would be zero. If its profits in that case were greater than nfc, 
then that is the equilibrium. 
We  will  use the  superscript  LP  (for limit  pricing)  to  denote  equilibrium 
prices and profits in this case. Three conditions must hold for an LP equilib- 167  Regional Patterns in the Law of One Price 
rium. First, firm  1’s profits must be  greater than  under the SC equilibrium. 
We have 
So, for IIY > II?,  we need 
The second condition is that at py,  firm 2’s profits are just zero. Note that 
the best that firm 2 can do is set its price as above, according to 
Firm 2 cannot price firm  1 out of the market since its fixed costs are higher 
than firm 1’s. So, firm 1 sets p1  so that 
If p,b*  is sufficiently high (greater than 0.2251),4 then a value for pfP  exists 
that satisfies the first two conditions. 
For p,b*  = 0.225 1, py  = 312px,  and firm 1  is indifferent between setting pI 
at 3/2p,  and setting it at 3p,. 
For p,b* < 0.225 1, firm 1 and firm 2 set prices at 3p,. Both firms produce, 
and they both make profits in this case, since pp  <  pxb* < 113. 
The third condition for an LP equilibrium is simply that, at the value of pfp 
that satisfies the first two conditions, IIy be positive. If the fixed cost, a, is 
sufficiently low, this condition is satisfied. (For example, it is always satisfied 
if a = 0.) 
So,  if  p,b*  > 0.2251  and  a  is  sufficiently  low,  McDonald‘s  will  price 
Wimpy’s out of the market if the two countries are in the same region. 
Regionalization  means  that  Wimpy’s may  not  produce.  Regionalization 
might mean the number of brand declines, if in fact Wimpy’s would have pro- 
duced were it just serving the foreign market. It is easy to produce an equilib- 
rium under which p,b* > 0.225  1, but Wimpy’s would sell burgers in the for- 
eign country if it were isolated from the home country. For example, if fixed 
costs for the potential firm 1 in the foreign country were very high, so that pp* 
were  large, then  firm 2 in the foreign  country would  set its price just low 
enough to keep firm 1 from entering. If firm  1 were kept out of  the market, 
then, when country 2 is in isolation and has a population of one, pTc:  = 112, 
so that firm 2’s revenue would not depend on its output. With p,a*  sufficiently 
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large, p: could be so high and cf  so low, that nf = p:c:  -  p,xT = 112 -  p, 
(c,* + b*)  would be positive. 
The implications of this example for hamburger prices are straightforward. 
If the two countries are not in the same region, their burger prices are different. 
Indeed, they do not even sell the same type of burger. But, if  the countries 
become regionalized, only one type of burger is marketed in the region-in 
this example, at the same price in both countries. 
6.4  Empirical Findings 
We investigate the behavior of final goods prices for eight goods (plus the 
aggregate  CPIs) measured  in  as many  as twenty-three  countries  and  eight 
North American cities. We investigate the determinants of failures of the law 
of one price between the locations. 
Our data are monthly price indexes for the overall CPI and subcategories of 
the CPI such as food, fuel, and so forth. The data are described in  detail in 
appendix A. For each good i, and for each pair of locations jk, we construct a 
relative price, q)k.  Naturally, when the prices are from different countries, we 
use the nominal exchange rate to express prices in a common currency in con- 
structing q;k.  Because our data are indexes and not actual prices, the level of 
q;, does not reveal anything about whether the law of one price holds or not. If 
the law of one price holds closely, however, then q;, would not vary much over 
time. Our measure of  the magnitude of  failures of  the law of one price is a 
measure of the volatility of q;l:  the standard deviation of the first difference of 
this series. 
The coverage of our price data varies from good to good. We  have suffi- 
ciently long time series for the aggregate CPI for twenty-nine locations. For 
the individual goods, our country coverage ranges from twenty-nine locations 
for food prices down to fourteen locations for health and recreation prices. If 
N is the number of locations, then we have N(N -  1)/2  location pairs. 
While our data is both time-series and cross-section, the only use we make 
of the time series is to calculate the measure of volatility for q;k.  Once we have 
those measures in hand, we proceed to a cross-sectional analysis that attempts 
to explain differences in the volatility  of qjP between locations according to 
characteristics of the location pairjk. 
We focus on four explanatory variables: distance, the volatility of the nomi- 
nal exchange rate, trade barriers, and regional groupings. Our basic empirical 
work regresses the standard deviation of changes in qfk  on measures of  these 
four variables. 
Table 6.1 contains some summary statistics. The top two lines of the table 
present the average standard deviation of qfk  for pairs of  locations that are in 
selected regions. Note that not all location pairs in our sample would be in- 
cluded in one of these regions because many pairs lie in different regions. 
These first two lines reveal a fairly strong correlation between the standard 169  Regional Patterns in the Law of One Price 
Table 6.1  Selected Summary Statistics 
North  us- 
Standard deviation (%)  America  Canada  Europe  EC  Asia 
Aggregate CPI 
Nominal exchange rate 
Food 
Housing 
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0.87  1.14  1.37 
1.08  1.55  1.08 
1.84  2.08  N/A 
3.11  1.56  2.76 
1.97  3.19  1.22 
0.94  1.20  0.40 
1.15  N/A  1.19 
1.08  N/A  1.58 
65 1  733  1,738 
Norest Column entries give the standard deviation of the relative price (the average standard devia- 
tion across all combinations) within the stated region. Each of  the relative prices used is in terms 
of log first differences. The average distance between locations is given in the final row. N/A indi- 
cates that there is no more than one pair of locations in the grouping. 
The following locations are included (by region): North America: Chicago, Los Angeles, New 
York, Philadelphia, Ottawa, Toronto, Vancouver, Winnipeg, and Mexico. Asia: Hong Kong, Japan, 
Singapore, and Taiwan. Europe: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. 
EC: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the 
United Kingdom. 
deviation of  nominal  exchange rates and the standard deviation of qjk.  Both 
series have low volatility for country pairings within the European Community, 
or within Europe more broadly defined, as well as for city pairs in the United 
States and Canada. On the other hand, Asian country pairs and location pairs 
in North America when Mexico is included have relatively  high nominal ex- 
change rate and relative price variability. 
The next eight rows  in table 6.1 report  the average volatility  for each of 
our eight goods for regional location pairs. We note that there are some large 
differences in the degree of volatility across the goods, but there still seems to 
be an overall correlation with the volatility of  the nominal exchange rate. 
The next  set of  numbers in table 6.1 calculate the volatility  of  “relative- 
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The final row  of  table 6.1 reports the average distance for location  pairs 
within  a region. Two things are worth noting here. First, while the European 
country pairs tend to have the lowest relative price volatility, they also are quite 
close-an  average of only 651 miles apart. Second, the average distance be- 
tween all of our location pairs is 3,887 miles. Note that location pairs within 
regions tend to be much closer on average than this. 
In table 6.2, we investigate the hypothesis  that the law of one price holds 
more nearly within regional groupings. Here we simply regress the measure of 
volatility  of relative prices against regional dummy variables5 For example, 
when the dependent variable is the standard deviation of q;k,  the North Ameri- 
can dummy variable takes on a value of one if both locationsj and k are within 
North America, and a zero otherwise. In the first column of table 6.2, we report 
the result of regressing the standard deviation of  the relative aggregate CPIs 
between  locations  (adjusted  for the exchange rate) on  dummy variables for 
North America, Europe, and Asia. We find that the volatility  is significantly 
lower for location pairs that are within North America or within Europe com- 
pared to the typical location pair. That conclusion is indicated by the signifi- 
cantly  negative  coefficients  on the  North American  and European regional 
dummies. We note that the coefficient on the Asian dummy variable, however, 
is positive, though not significantly different from zero. It seems as though the 
law of one price holds no better between two Asian countries than between a 
typical pair of countries that are not within a regional grouping. But, because 
our Asian grouping consists of only four countries, we need to be very cautious 
in our interpretation. 
Table 6.2, in fact, shows that across almost all of our individual goods, the 
law of one price holds more nearly for locations that are within North America 
or within Europe. The only case in which the coefficient on the North Ameri- 
can or European dummies is not significantly less than zero is for the recre- 
ation goods category for Europe. The last column of table 6.2 pools all of our 
goods together (not including  the aggregate  CPI) and constrains  the coeffi- 
cients on the dummy variables to be the same for all goods. We find the coeffi- 
cient on the North American and European dummy variables is strongly sig- 
nificantly  negative, while  the Asian  dummy variable  has a coefficient  that, 
while negative, is not significantly different from zero. 
While table 6.2 shows that the law of one price holds better among locations 
that are within North America or Europe, because the standard deviation of 
relative prices is lower for location pairs within those regions, it offers no clue 
as to why this might be true. We hypothesize three explanations for this find- 
ing:  that  nominal  exchange  rate  variability  is lower for these  intraregional 
pairs; that they are closer in distance to each other; and that their mutual trade 
barriers are lower. 
So we  specify that the volatility  of  q;l is related to the natural log of the 
5. We include a dummy variable for each individual location, as well. Table 6.2  Regressions Relating Price Volatility to Regional Dummies 
~~  ~ 
Fuel and  Household 
CPI  Food  Housing  Clothing  Electricity  Health  Equipment  Recreation  Transport  Combined 
NorthAmerica  -1.34  -02  -1.35  -02  -1.01  -02  -1.16  -02  -1.64  -02  -7.63  -03  -1.20  -02  -3.04  -01  -5.86  -03  -1.08  -02 
(-12.7)  (-14.4)  (-9.20)  (-5.96)  (-9.39)  (-1.14)  (-5.66)  (-11.1)  (-1.94)  (-14.7) 
(-20.3)  (-19.9)  (-19.2)  (-4.77)  (-4.95)  (-1.09)  (-4.20)  (-0.10)  (-2.75)  (-19.8) 
(1.60)  ( 1.45)  (2.18)  (-1.05)  (- 1.37)  (0.89)  ( 1.04)  (-1.04)  (-0.13) 
Europe  -1.83  -02  -1.59  -02  -1.90  -02  -1.21  -02  -8.34  -03  -1.73  -02  -1.22  -02  -4.52  -04  -1.16  -02  -1.54  -02 
Asia  2.95 -03  2.37 -03  3.89 -03  -3.14  -03  N/Aa  -2.86  -02  5.00 -03  8.70 -03  -4.87  -03  -1.88  -04 
Nores: All regressions contain as explanatory variables a dummy for each individual location, in addition to the variables listed in the cell. Individual goods dummies 
are contained in the combined regression. Heteroscedasticity-consistent  t-statistics (White 1980) are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is the standard 
deviation of the first difference in the relative price. 
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distance between locations j  and k.  We choose the natural log function because 
it has been used in the empirical literature on distance and the volume of trade, 
and because it has the appealing property of being very concave. A priori, we 
doubt very much that if two countries are 7,000 miles apart that adding another 
500 miles makes much difference in their degree of integration, but there is a 
substantial difference between two countries that are 200 miles apart and two 
that are 700 miles apart. 
Next, if nominal prices exhibit a particular kind of stickiness, then volatility 
of q;, should be closely related to variability of the nominal exchange rate be- 
tween locations j  and k. Specifically, if goods prices are set in the currency 
where the good is sold, the q;, should fluctuate one for one with the exchange 
rate. 
One problem with including the volatility of the nominal exchange rate as a 
right-hand-side variable in the regression is that it may be endogenous. That 
is, there may be a relation between the volatility of the exchange rate and the 
volatility  of  qik that is not causal. Exogenous  shocks may influence both the 
exchange rate and q;k. One way of dealing with this potential problem is by 
using instrumental variables. However, it is difficult to conceive of a valid in- 
strument  in  this case. We  estimate  our basic  equation using  ordinary  least 
squares, but we will return to this problem later. 
We also consider measures of trade barriers: average tariff rates and the frac- 
tion of industries affected by nontariff barriers. 
If our marketing and distribution costs story has any merit, then the law of 
one price should hold more nearly for intraregional pairs even when distance, 
exchange rate volatility, and trade barriers are taken into account. So we in- 
clude the regional dummy variables in some of our specifications along with 
the other explanatory variables. 
Finally, all of our regressions contain dummy variables for each location. 
That is, for the relative price q;L,  both the dummy variables for location j  and 
location k receive a value of one. These variables are included  as a way  of 
dealing with different measurement practices in our various countries. Some 
countries may record prices in wch a way  as to increase (or decrease) their 
volatility  compared to  other countries.  This  will  be  reflected  in  a  larger 
(smaller) than average coefficient on that country’s dummy. Because  we in- 
clude a dummy for each location, there is no need to include a constant term 
in the regressions. 
Table 6.3 reports regressions that include the log distance and the standard 
deviation of the nominal exchange rate as explanatory variables. Both variables 
do well in accounting for relative price variability. The coefficient on the dis- 
tance variable has the correct sign for seven of the nine goods, and is significant 
in all of these cases. Only for health and transport does distance take on the 
wrong sign, but it is not statistically significant in either case. 
The standard deviation of the nominal exchange rate is significant (and has 
the correct sign) in all of the regressions. In fact, this variable has exceptionally Table 6.3  Relative Price Volatility, Distance, and Nominal Exchange Rate Volatility 
Fuel and  Household 
CPI  Food  Housing  Clothing  Electricity  Health  Equipment  Recreation  Transport  Combined 
Log (distance)  9.55 -04  1.25 -03  6.39 -04  2.23 -03  9.49 -04  -4.45  -04  1.13 -03  8.57 -04  -8.77  -04  7.89-04 
(3.71)  (5.41)  (2.24)  (3.29)  (2.46)  (-1.52)  (1.53)  (5.72)  (-1.26)  (3.15) 
Standard deviation of  0.85  0.74  0.77  0.53  0.57  I .06  0.66  0.76  1.02  0.72 
nominal exchange rate  (31.6)  (30.7)  (26.0)  (6.12)  (15.0)  (27.5)  (7.41)  (25.4)  (12.1)  (26.3) 
Numbers of pairs in sample  406  406  325  171  I90  91  120  91  I53  1,547 
Notes: The regression contains a dummy for each individual location, in addition to the variables listed in the cell. Individual goods dummies are contained in the 
combined regression. Heteroscedasticity-consistent 1-statistics (White 1980) are reported in parcnthcses. The dependent variable is the standard deviation of  the first 
difference in the relative price. 
For each good, the sample includes the following locations: CPI and Food: all countries in table 6.  I  plus South Africa. Housing: all North America and Asia, all 
Europe except Portugal and Sweden. Clothing: all North America and Asia, plus Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kngdom, and South Africa. 
Fuel and electricity: all North America except Mexico, plus Japan, and all Europe except Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden. Health: all North America, Japan, 
Taiwan, the Netherlands, Norway, and Switzerland. Household equipment: all North America, Japan, Hong Kong, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, 
and South Africa. Recreation: all North America except Mexico, plus Japan, Taiwan, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. Transportation: all North America and Asia, 
Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. 174  Charles Engel and John H. Rogers 
great  power  in  explaining  the  standard  deviation  of  relative  prices.  The 
t-statistics are all very large, even when the sample size is small. Moreover, the 
coefficients are large-ranging  from 0.53 to 1.06. An increase in the standard 
deviation of nominal exchange rates of one unit translates into nearly a one- 
unit increase in the standard deviation of relative prices. That is the type of 
response one would expect if nominal price stickiness were important. If nomi- 
nal prices were completely fixed in the country where the good is sold, then 
nominal exchange rate variability would translate one for one into relative price 
variability. We do not see a one-to-one relation in our data, but it is close. 
The last column of table 6.3 reports regression results when the data for the 
eight goods (but not the aggregate CPI) are pooled. There we see that the effect 
of distance on price variability is positive and significant at the 5 percent level. 
The border dummy variable receives  a coefficient of 0.72 and is highly sig- 
nificant. 
In panel  1 of table 6.4, we include dummy variables for whether location 
pairs lie in North America, Europe, or Asia. We note that these dummy vari- 
ables are highly collinear with distance. We saw in table 6.1 that location pairs 
within these regions tend to be much closer than nonregional pairs. As a result 
of this collinearity, the individual significance of the distance coefficients and 
the  regional  dummies  is  diminished.  But,  across  the  regressions,  patterns 
emerge that are worth noting. 
First,  nominal  exchange rate  variability  is  still significant  and  important 
quantitatively in these regressions. 
Second, distance still is positive in seven of the nine regressions, but it is 
significant in only four. 
Finally, the following patterns emerge for the regional dummies: the North 
American dummies and European dummies tend to be negative. For several of 
the individual goods regressions, these dummy variables have negative coeffi- 
cients and are significant.  For the regression using the aggregate CPI, both 
coefficients are negative and significant. For the regression that pools the indi- 
vidual goods data, the North American dummy is negative and significant at 
the 5 percent level, and the European dummy is negative and significant at the 
10 percent level (in a one-sided test). This indicates that price dispersion  is 
lower among locations within these regions than average. 
The results for the Asian dummy are more mixed. Most of the coefficients 
tend to be positive but insignificant. The coefficient in the regression using the 
pooled  data, however, is negative and significant at the  10 percent level. We 
note that the weak findings for the Asia region parallel the findings of Frankel, 
Stein, and Wei (1995), who found weaker evidence that the Asian nations have 
formed a trading bloc than for North America or Europe. 
In panel 2 of table 6.4, we drop the distance variable, so that we use only 
the regional dummy variables and nominal exchange rate variability as explan- 
atory variables. The statistical significance of  the North American and Euro- 
pean dummy variables jumps up for many of the individual goods. This is a Table 6.4  Regressions Relating Price Volatility to Nominal Exchange Rate Volatility, Distance, and Regional Dummies 
Fuel and  Household 
CPI  Food  Housing  Clothing  Electricity  Health  Equipment  Recreation  Transport  Combined 
Log (distance) 
Standard deviation of 
North America 
nominal exchange rate 
Europe 
Asia 
Standard deviation of 
North America 
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-5.15  -03 
(-7.40) 
-2.13  -03 
(-2.73) 
-2.73  -05 
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-3.18  -03 
(-3.06) 






-3.07  -03 
(-3.58) 




Panel  1 
(0.23)  (3.33) 
0.47  0.67 
(4.19)  (11.9) 
2.68 -04  1.51 -03 
-5.92  -03  3.97 -03 
(-2.02)  (2.03) 
-3.65  -03  2.68 -03 
(-1.03)  (1.71) 
-4.51  -03  NIA” 
(-  I .27) 
Panel 2 
0.47  0.7  I 
(4.23)  (12.5) 
-6.36  -03  2.65 -03 
(-2.87)  (1.34) 
-4.06  -03  -6.20  -06 
(- 1.32)  (-0.004) 
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(-2.09) 






-3.61  -03 
(- 1.24) 
-4.61  -03 
(-1.32) 




-3.72  -03 
(- 1.56) 


















-4.06  -04 
(-0.32) 
-1.77  -03 
(-0.70) 
-2.53  -04  -  1.73 -04 
(-0.23)  (-0.47) 
1  .05  0.68 
(12.0)  (20.0) 
1.76 -03  -3.73  -03 
(0.65)  (-4.07) 
3.50 -03  -  1.76 -03 
(0.88)  (- 1 .55) 
-  1.48 -03  -2.15  -03 
(-0.41)  (-1.55) 
1.04  0.68 
(12.3)  (20.1) 
2.14 -03  -3.48  -03 
(0.99)  (-4.64) 
4.06 -03  -  1.48 -03 
(1.28)  (- 1.52) 
-1.11  -03  -1.86  -03 
(-0.35)  ( -  1.49) 
Notes: All regressions contain as explanatory variables a dummy for each individual location, in addition to the variables listed in the cell. Individual goods dummies 
are contained in the combined regression. Heteroscedasticity-consistent f-statistics (White 1980) are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is the standard 
deviation of the first difference in the relative price. 
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result of the high collinearity between the regional dummy variables and dis- 
tance. The Asian regional dummy variable is still insignificant in almost all of 
the regressions. 
We tried various other dummy variables for regional groupings of location 
pairs: just the cities in Canada and the United States, the countries of the Euro- 
pean Community, and the countries of the European Free Trade Association. 
These dummy variables generally are not significant. 
We next ask whether formal trade barriers contribute to price dispersion. In 
table 6.5, we add two measures of  trade barriers between pairs of countries to 
our regression that includes the log of distance and the standard deviation of 
the nominal exchange rate. The first measure is based on the trade-weighted 
average tariff rate in 1988. The tariff measure between locationj  and location 
k is taken to be (1 + T,)(  1 + T~),  where T,  is the average tariff rate in location  i 
(i =  j,  k).  We adopt this measure since, following the discussion in section 6.2, 
it gives a rough measure of the range of fluctuation in relative prices allowed 
for by constant tariff rates. When locationsj and k are both cities within either 
Canada or the United States, or if both are in Europe, we set the tariff measure 
equal to one. This measure of trade barriers is clearly very crude. It cannot 
distinguish any ~ort  of discriminatory tariffs between two locations, except for 
the U.S. and Canadian cities and the European countries. Additionally, the bar- 
riers are only measured during one year, and are not distinguished by good. 
The second measure is based on a calculation of the fraction of traded goods 
industries affected by nontariff barriers on imports for each country in 1988. 
To get the relevant  observation for location jk, we add the nontariff-barrier 
index for locationsj and k.  For pairs of cities within the United States or Can- 
ada, and country pairs within Europe, this measure is set to zero. 
There is a great deal of collinearity in the two measures of trade barriers, so 
we run regressions separately for the tariff measure and the nontariff-barrier 
measure. There is also high collinearity between the degree of openness and 
the regional dummies. We note that, when all of these variables are included in 
the regression, essentially no individual coefficient is statistically significant. 
In panel  1 of table 6.5, we report results for regressions that include tariffs, 
distance, and the standard deviation of the nominal exchange rate. We expect 
the coefficient on the tariff variable to be positive-when  there are higher tariff 
barriers, there should be more relative price volatility. However, there is only 
one instance where the coefficient is positive and significant in these rcgres- 
sions-in  the regression for clothing. 
The regression with nontariff bamers included, along with distance and ex- 
change rate volatility, is reported in the second panel of table 6.5. These results 
are puzzling. Generally we find that pairs of countries that have high nontariff 
barriers actually have lower relative price dispersion. The coefficient on the 
nontariff barriers is negative and significant in most regressions. 
In general, however, we should probably not put too much stock in the re- 
gressions in table 6.5, since our measures  of  trade barriers are so crude. In Tahle 6.5  Regressiom Relating Price Volatility to Distance and Trade Barriers 
Fuel and  Household 
CPI  Fond  Housing  Clothing  Electricity  Health  Equipment  Recreation  Transport  Combined 
. .  -  --  -  -.  -  -  .- 
Panel  1 
Log (distatm)  1.03 -03  1.31 -03  7.24 -04  2.12  -03  9.17  -04  1.56 -04  1.15 -I)3  7.81 -04  -8.65  -04  8.26 -(W 
(3.74)  (5.33)  (2.46)  (3.13)  (2.38)  (0.24)  ( 1.45)  (2.70)  (- 1.20)  (3.21;) 
Standard deviation of  0.89  0.78  0.8  I  0.35  0.53  1.07  0.66  0.76  1.03  0.73 
nominal exchange rate  (22.9)  (22.4)  (19.5)  (2.74)  (10.5)  (26.4)  (4.37)  (25.2)  (10.5)  (19.0) 
Tariff  -8.66  -03  -8.52  -03  -9.03  -02  3.62 -02  9.14  -03  -6.70  -03  -1.53  -03  7.17  -04  -8.21  -04  -1.96  -03 
(- 1.34)  (-1.47)  (-1.24)  (I.%)  (1.21)  (-1.03)  (-0.OKj  (0.31)  (-0,07)  (-0.32) 
Panel 2 
Log (distance)  1.09  -03  1.33  -03  8.49 -01  2.29 -03  9.46 -04  -3.22  -04  9.17 -04  7.90  -04  -6.81  -04  8.63  -04 
Standard deviation of  0.92  0.79  0.85  0.58  0.55  1.06  0.92  0.81  1.18  0.80 
Nontuiff barrier  -5.88  -05  -4.12  -05  -7.62  -05  -3.34  -05  1.25  -05  -4.99  -05  -1.53  -04  -4.47  -05  -1.99  -04  -6.76  -US 
(4.05)  (5.51)  (3.02)  (3.353  (2.45)  (-1.09)  (1.27)  (5.73)  (-  I .05)  (3.44) 
noinitial cxchange rate  (27.8)  (26.5)  (25.  I)  (5.67)  (I 2.4)  (28.0)  (8.38)  (2h.9)  (1 3.8)  (24.7) 
(-3.62)  (-2.81)  (-4.46)  (-0.83j  (0.69)  (-1.96)  (-4.12)  (-3.98)  (-4.70)  (-4.83) 
,Votes: All regressions contain as explanatory variables a dummy for each individual location, in addition to the variables listed in the cell. Individual goods dummies 
arc contained in the cortibiricd rcgrcssion. Hctcrosccdasticity-consistent  r-statistics (Whitc 1980) arc rcponcd in pmnthcscs.  Thc dcpcndcnt vwiablc is thc slandard 
deviation of the tirst difference in the relative price. 'The sample includes the locations listed io table 6.1. 178  Charles Engel and John H. Rogers 
Table 6.6  Correlation Matrix of Right-Hand-Side Variables 
Log  Standard deviation of  Nontariff  Region 
(distance)  nominal exchange rate  Tariff  barrier  dummy 
Log (distance)  1  .oo 
Standard deviation of 
Tariff  0.67  0.58  1 .oo 
Nontariff barrier  0.54  0.2s  0.73  1.00 
Region dummy  -0.87  -0.46  -0.71  -0.57  1.00 
nominal exchange rate  0.49  1  .oo 
Notes: Entries give the correlation between each pair of series. Region dummy is unity when each 
country in a pair is in the same region, and is zero otherwise. The other series are as defined in 
the text. 
addition, the measures of trade barriers are highly  correlated  with  the other 
explanatory  variables. Table 6.6 displays the correlation  matrix for our five 
right-hand-side  variables:  the log of distance, the  standard deviation  of  the 
nominal exchange rate, tariffs, nontariff barriers, and regional dummies. The 
regional dummy variable in this table has the form that location pairjk receives 
a value of  one if  both  locations  are within  one of  the three regions  (North 
America,  Europe, Asia),  and  a  zero  otherwise. The degree of  correlation 
among these variables is striking. Location  pairs  within  regions  tend to be 
close together, have a stable exchange rate, and have low trade barriers. So it 
is difficult to separate out these effects on the law of one price. 
Finally, in table 6.7, we return to the issue of endogeneity  of the nominal 
exchange rate. We have seen that in all of our regressions, the standard devia- 
tion of the exchange rate is highly significant. Our preferred explanation for 
this is that as sJk,  the nominal exchange rate between locations j and k, varies, 
then qfk  varies because of nominal price stickiness. We calculate qih asp; ls,,p;, 
where p; is the nominal price level in location j,  expressed in location j’s cur- 
rency, and similarly for p;. If p; and p; are fixed (the most extreme form of 
nominal price stickiness), then q;k moves one for one with s,~ 
However, an alternative explanation for the correlation of sJh and q;k is that 
both variables are influenced by some sort of real shocks. For example, shocks 
to productivity in the nontraded sectors in countries j and k might cause q;k to 
change. Monetary policy might be conducted in such a way that the nominal 
exchange rate tends to be influenced by the same real shocks. 
If this type of explanation were true, the real shocks should also be reflected 
in p;lp, and p;lpk,  where pJ and ph  represent the aggregate CPIs in locations j 
and k. That is, real shocks that affect relative prices will cause the price of 
good i to vary relative to the overall price level in each location. So we consider 
an alternative measure of the relative price variability between locations j and 
Summary statistics for these “relative-relative’’ prices are presented  in the 
k‘  q;k  (p;  lP~>l(  pi  IPk). Table 6.7  Relative-Relative Price Volatility, Distance, and Nominal Exchange Rate Volatility 
Fuel and  Household 
Food  Housing  Clothing  Electricity  Health  Equipment  Recreation  Transport  Combined 
~~  ~  ~~  ~  ~~~~ 
Log (distance)  3.89 -04  -8.57  -04  1.28 -03  2.45 -04  1.87 -04  2.83 -05  6.19 -04  -5.51  -04  1.76 -05 
(5.54)  (-0.77)  (2.29)  (0.61)  (1.21)  (0.23)  (4.02)  (-2.10)  (0.07) 
Standard deviation of  -9.85  -03  2.49 -02  0.15  0.11  0.13  4.09 -02  6.90 -02  0.33  6.77 -02 
nominal exchange rate  (- 1.30)  (2.15)  (2.11)  (2.82)  (6.24)  (2.74)  (2.23)  (10.2)  (2.56) 
Notes:  The regression contains a dummy for each individual location, in  addition to the variables listed in the cell. Individual goods dummies are contained in the 
combined regression. Heteroscedasticity-consistent  t-statistics (White 1980) are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is the standard deviation of the first- 
differenced goods price divided by  the CPI. 180  Charles Engel and John H. Rogers 
bottom half of table 6.1. There we report the average standard deviation of qik 
for location pairs in various regions. 
In table 6.7, we regress the standard deviation of ij;k on log of distance and 
the standard deviation of the nominal exchange rate. With the exception of the 
regression for food (and the pooled regression), the coefficients on the nominal 
exchange rate variable are still positive and significant in all of the regressions. 
This correlation cannot be a result of fluctuating nominal exchange rates and 
sticky nominal prices, since the nominal exchange rate does not appear in the 
calculation  of  i&.  This indicates  some simultaneity  in the determination  of 
nominal exchange rate variation and relative price variation. Both may be re- 
sponding to real shocks. 
Of course, the ideal way to deal with this problem statistically is to use an 
instrumental variable for the nominal exchange rate variable, but we were un- 
able to find a satisfactory instrument. We note that, in the regressions reported 
in table  6.7,  the explanatory power for nominal  exchange rate variability is 
much lower than in our other regressions, while still statistically significant in 
most cases. This probably  means that, while the mutual response of relative 
prices and the nominal exchange rate to real shocks accounts for some of the 
correlation we find between  the standard deviation of  qlk and s,~, it does not 
account for most of it. It is likely that nominal price stickiness accounts for 
much of this relation. 
6.5  Conclusions 
Our empirical analysis indicates that nominal exchange rate variability and 
distance between locations account for much of the failure of the law of one 
price between locations. We also find some evidence that locations within re- 
gions lower relative price dispersion even taking into account these factors. 
Nominal price stickiness accounts for large divergences in prices between 
locations. As the nominal exchange rate varies, relative prices swing widely. 
However, we also note that to some extent the nominal exchange rate and rela- 
tive prices respond to common shocks. The significance of sticky prices for 
allocation of resources is an open question.  It could be that these failures of 
the law of one price represent  significant distortions. The relative price of a 
good should respond to its relative scarcity. But, when we look at prices of 
similar goods between locations, prices do not seem to be responding to those 
types of signals. It is not clear to what extent resources are misallocated as a 
result. It is possible that nonprice mechanisms have developed that circumvent 
the problem. This is certainly an important area for future research. 
When we include only distance along with nominal exchange rate variability 
in our regressions, we find that locations that are more distant are less inte- 
grated. This result is not surprising, and is consistent with the findings of the 
gravity model of trade. We note, however, that distance may matter for reasons 181  Regional Patterns in the Law of One Price 
other than simply transport costs. Engel and Rogers (1995) find evidence that 
labor markets are more closely integrated for nearby locations. In that study, 
price dispersion was found to be significantly influenced by wage dispersion. 
This is interesting, because if distance matters for regionalization because of 
transport costs, then there is little that policymakers  can hope to achieve to 
increase market integration. But there may be some room for increased integra- 
tion if factor markets can be made more open. We note, however, that the sig- 
nificance of distance as an explanatory variable drops when regional dummy 
variables are added to the regressions, although its significance does not en- 
tirely disappear. 
Our crude measures of trade barriers find little evidence to confirm the hy- 
pothesis that greater protection leads to greater failures in the law of one price. 
We hesitate to conclude from this that trade barriers have little effect on final 
goods prices, however. First, as we explain, our measures of trade barriers are 
aggregate measures undifferentiated by good, by country of origin of the im- 
port, or by time. Second, there is a high degree of collinearity between our 
measure of openness and our other explanatory variables,  so it is difficult to 
separate out their individual effects. 
Finally, we find that relative price dispersion is affected by whether or not 
the location pair are within a region. For European and North American loca- 
tions, relative price variability is significantly  smaller than for other location 
pairs. We have offered a potential explanation for why regions matter: distribu- 
tion and marketing are more integrated for locations within regions. We can 
offer, however, no direct evidence on this hypothesis. We note that price disper- 
sion is not reduced for country pairs within the Asian region. 
The question of whether markets have become more regionalized is an inter- 
esting one. It is sparked by the observation that regional trade arrangements 
have increased  in number and perhaps  importance  in recent years.  But our 
findings suggest that further study of regionalization can be greatly enhanced 
by taking a broader view of the determinants of market integration. 
Appendix A 
Data 
Our data set contains monthly consumer prices from January 1980 to Decem- 
ber  1994. The data is from Datastream, and consists of eight disaggregated 
components of the CPI: food; fuel and electricity; housing; clothing; health; 
transportation; recreation and education; and household equipment, durables, 
and furniture. We also use data on the overall CPI. 
In  addition, comparable  CPI data for four Canadian  cities-Ottawa,  To- 182  Charles Engel and John H. Rogers 
ronto, Winnipeg, and Vancouver-were  obtained from Statistics Canada. Data 
for four U.S. cities-New  York, Los Angeles, Chicago, and Philadelphia-are 
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
All of the price data is seasonally unadjusted. 
Nominal exchange rates are monthly averages from the International Mone- 
tary Fund's International Financial Statistics. 
Distances are calculated  as great circle distances  between  locations, ob- 
tained  from PCGLOBE. They are measured from a country's  capital when 
country data is used. 
The data on average tariff rates and nontariff barriers is from Lee and Swa- 
gel (1994), who in turn obtained the data from the UN Conference on Trade 
and Development  Micro TCM System. The tariff data is the trade-weighted 
average tariff rate. The nontariff barrier numbers are the fraction of Customs 
Cooperation Council Nomenclature four- or five-digit categories in each coun- 
try for which any nontariff barriers are in place. Both series were measured 
in 1988. 
Appendix B 
Proofs of Propositions in Section 6.3.  I 
We prove the two propositions at the end of section 6.3.1. 
First, take the case of 4 = 4*.  Suppose that l/q* < 117, so that 
Pz = P:  < PI  = P$. 
p(b-li/+ = wpl(+-li'm  + (1 -  w)p  (6-114 <  p,'rn-IV+, 
Now, note that 
sop <  p,.  Likewise, p,* <  p*. If w > o*,  then p* <  p. So 
P:  <  P"  <  P <  PI. 
Thus we have  1 < plp*  < p,/p,*.  Analogously,  if  lly < 1/y*, we have 
p,lp,* <  p/p* < 1. So, p/p* is closer to unity than p,/p: is. 
If + # +*, p/p* may be farther from unity than pIIp:. Suppose, for example, 
that  l/q*  < Ily. Then, from above, p <  p,  and p,* <  p*. It is possible, if the 
markups are sufficiently different, that pl <  pf,  even with l/q*  < lly. In that 
case. we have 
P  <  PI  <  P:  < P*, 
so 1 <  p,/p,* <  p/p*. In this case, plp* is farther from unity than p,lp,*  is. 183  Regional Patterns in the Law of One Price 
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Comment  Kenneth A. Froot 
Charles Engel and John Rogers have written a stimulating paper, one that is 
apropos of the topics in this conference. Some of the papers we have discussed 
thus far have focused on trade flows and the predictive ability of gravity mod- 
els. As  several people have remarked,  the standard neoclassical  equilibrium 
does not predict gravity trade patterns. Indeed, in a neoclassical world of per- 
fect competition and complete integration, bilateral trade patterns are not de- 
fined. In such a world, there are always perfect  substitutes available for any 
good (since every producer is by definition “small”). Thus, volumes of trade 
do  not tell us much; moreover, no observed pattern of trade can rule out perfect 
integration and competition in traded goods markets. 
In this context, it is nice to have Engel and Rogers’s paper, which focuses on 
prices rather than volumes. Under the hypothesis that complete integration and 
perfect competition  prevail, bilateral trade volumes may not be defined, but 
relative prices  are-the  law of  one price  should  hold. With  this as a well- 
defined null hypothesis, Engel and Rogers ask whether gravity-type factors are 
important for deviations from the law of one price. Thus, we have tests of a 
well-specified null against a well-specified alternative hypothesis. This cannot 
be said of the gravity models, which try to explain trade flows. 
In spite of  this clear advantage to examining prices, there is, unfortunately, 
also a dark side to these data. Engel and Rogers use final consumption prices 
in their regressions. This has real disadvantages if one wants to understand the 
composition of  trade and the integration of traded goods markets. All traded 
goods contain nontraded components by the time they are consumed-distri- 
bution and delivery  services, advertising services, name-brand value, and so 
forth. These components differ markedly, even when the underlying “good” is 
exactly the same. Thus, it is not clear that one should interpret all deviations 
from the law of one price as a deviation from the law of one price. 
As an example of this, I checked the price of a pint of Vermont-state pure 
maple syrup on my drive up to this conference in Woodstock, Vermont. The 
price of syrup at a tourist store was more than 40 percent higher than an identi- 
cal pint at a large grocery store. This differential persists, in spite of the lack 
of a border or real distance between the stores. The differential might represent 
a rent to the tourist store; it might represent the tourist store’s less efficient 
distribution system; or it might represent the value and cost of the service of 
providing a collection of Vermont gifts to the tourist. If it is the first, then a 
deviation from the law of one price has legitimately occurred, but if it is some 
combination of the latter two, then the pints of syrup are different goods when 
sold in the different stores. No strict comparison of price is, in that case, to- 
tally appropriate. 
Kenneth A. Froot is the Industrial Bank of Japan Professor of Finance and director of research at 
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With this as a caveat, I applaud the emphasis on distribution systems in the 
theoretical portion of Engel and Rogers paper. They have traded intermediate 
products being sold by a monopolistic “distributor.” Two products sold in the 
same country (or in two countries within a “region”) have the same distribution 
system. As a result, their price can differ only if the underlying traded good 
differs. 
I have no doubt that differences in distribution  systems are an important 
aspect of deviations from the law of one price. Unfortunately, Engel and Rog- 
ers have no means to identify the component of the deviation  attributable to 
the distribution system, as opposed to, say, sticky prices. Thus, while their the- 
ory section is interesting and somewhat original, it does little to inform the 
tests that follow. 
These tests demonstrate that the volatility of deviations from the law of one 
price is sensitive to the volatility of exchange rates, as well as, to a lesser extent, 
distance and regional grouping. When Engel and Rogers use as the dependent 
variable  the “relative-relative  price,” they get similar answers. This relative- 
relative price is the ratio of a particular good relative to the CPI compared to 
the same ratio for another country. The idea of using this price is that the nomi- 
nal exchange rate never enters in its computation, so that if  sticky prices are 
driving the results, there should be little correlation of nominal exchange rate 
volatility with the volatility of relative-relative prices. 
In fact, Engel and Rogers note that there is still a strong positive association 
between the volatility of relative-relative prices and that of  nominal exchange 
rates. However, I wonder about this association. It is noteworthy that, in the 
regression estimates, the magnitudes of the coefficients are very different, yet 
the measured standard errors for each are small. This is unlikely to be an unbi- 
ased representation of what is going on. It suggests that the true standard errors 
are larger, thereby understating the importance of sticky prices in the results. 
Two other points. First, it seems that the results, which rely on volatilities 
measured from monthly price changes, pick up mostly high frequency fluctua- 
tions. An alternative approach would measure the volatility of levels of relative 
prices (perhaps even around the theoretical mean dictated by  the law of one 
price).  This would provide  lower-frequency  information  on the relationship 
between relative price volatility and exchange rate volatility. 
Second, the ambiguous results on trade barriers do not seem surprising to 
me. Ceteris paribus, trade restrictions may enlarge deviations from the law of 
one price. In practice, however, trade policy is endogenous, and may respond 
to misaligned exchange rates. Thus, it is possible that highly restrictive trade 
policies will tend to kick in during periods when there are large misalignments, 
thereby tending to diminish deviations from the law of one price. 
Overall, I found this paper an interesting and useful extension of work that 
both Engel and Rogers have pursued. This work is beginning to get at the dif- 
ficult question of what explains intercountry price differentials. In this paper 
Engel and Rogers show that region and gravity have only a modest effect on 186  Charles Engel and John H. Rogers 
prices in comparison to exchange rate volatility. This tells us that the lack of 
integration is not really  spatial, and that, if anything, it depends strongly on 
exchange rate arrangements that explain nominal exchange rate volatility. 
Comment  Michael Knetter 
In general, I am a very big fan of Engel and Rogers-especially  the recent 
paper entitled  “How Wide Is the Border?’  Rather  than  flatter you with  the 
details of what I like about your work, I will focus mainly on how I think you 
might improve this paper, which appears to be a sequel. 
First,  some general  comments about the dependent variable,  the  relative 
price volatility measure. It is likely that market baskets are different in differ- 
ent countries. Consequently, there is a source of measurement error that will 
exaggerate the volatility of the relative price index. Furthermore, this measure- 
ment error will  be correlated  with  many  of  the right-hand-side  variables- 
distance  between  markets  and exchange rate volatility  in particular.  This is 
because many of the city pairs will have identical market baskets and neigh- 
boring countries probably have more similar consumption patterns. I am also 
bothered by the use of monthly volatility measures to study sources of failure 
in the law of  one price.  One month is not  sufficient time for the forces of 
arbitrage to operate in goods markets. In general, it might be more helpful to 
study deviations in price levels rather than their volatilities. Although that is 
not possible with your data, there are some problems of interpretation that arise 
when you focus on volatilities.  In a sense you’ve stacked the deck in favor of 
your nominal-price-stickiness  story. 
The mapping from regression coefficients to underlying trade frictions could 
benefit from more discussion. The underlying trade frictions that you seek to 
compare are transportation  costs,  trade barriers,  and “nominal  price  sticki- 
ness.” I consider the latter to be a manifestation of frictions, while the former 
are true frictions themselves. Furthermore, the proxies for transport costs and 
trade barriers at least in principle are good measures of these frictions (distance 
and average tariff rates or coverage ratios). The exchange rate volatility vari- 
able is in some sense a measure of a “friction,” but I don’t see a direct mapping 
to nominal price stickiness in the way your other right-hand-side variables map 
to the frictions they are intended to measure. Therefore, I don’t really know 
how to interpret the regression results. You  are regressing a measure of a real 
exchange rate volatility on a nominal exchange rate volatility and two measures 
of friction. I am not surprised that the nominal exchange rate volatility and the 
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real exchange rate volatility are highly correlated-this  has been a big issue in 
international finance for years. To  say that you have found that violations in the 
law of one price are due to nominal price stickiness because real and nominal 
exchange rate volatilities are highly correlated begs the question. What are the 
frictions that make nominal prices sticky? 
Another reason that nominal volatilities are the dominant variable in your 
work is that you measure deviations from the law of one price as volatilities 
rather than absolute deviations between prices. Transport costs and trade barri- 
ers will help to explain differences in the level of prices, but may not increase 
volatility  very  much. Exchange  rate  volatility  will directly  increase  relative 
price volatility, especially at the monthly frequency. Just as theory models can 
be “rigged” to find particular results, I feel this empirical paper is “rigged.” I’d 
be more interested, for example, in regression results without the exchange rate 
volatility measure. I’d also like to see a simple correlation matrix so I have a 
better sense of what is driving the partial correlations. Because of  the above 
issues, I think you need to be very careful about interpretations  and conclu- 
sions, In particular, you should not claim too much about the relative impor- 
tance of distance and trade barriers in explaining deviations from the law of 
one price.  Indeed, the fact that trade barriers  are uncorrelated  or negatively 
correlated with your measure of relative price volatility suggests to me there is 
a fundamental problem with the empirical framework. No one could seriously 
believe that increased trade barriers have no effect or positive effects on price 
integration. 
Part of the problem could be in the measurement  of trade barriers. Some- 
times average tariff rates or coverage ratios will understate the degree of trade 
frictions. Furthermore, much of the unmeasured forms of protection are proba- 
bly the main tools used to keep export competitors from fully passing through 
exchange rate changes to gain market share. For example, the threat of anti- 
dumping suits and countervailing duties may well increase when exchange rate 
fluctuations grant temporary competitive advantage to foreign producers in an 
industry. In this sense, the tools of unmeasured protection might well be corre- 
lated with nominal exchange rate volatilities. 
In the end, I don’t think this paper teaches me much beyond what I learned 
from “How Wide Is the Border?” Looking at the simple correlations between 
the variables used in this paper as well as a regression  without the nominal 
exchange rate volatility measure might help me better interpret the data in this 
paper. Although data on price levels for specific products  are hard to obtain 
across countries, they may be essential to understanding the sources of viola- 
tions in the law of one price. This Page Intentionally Left Blank